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Abstract 
 
The Problem of the Criterion arises from two plausible intuitions: first, belief sources (such as testimony 
and perception) should be reliable. Second, a person should be justified in believing that the source is 
reliable before it can produce justified beliefs. The problem is that these intuitions create a vicious 
circularity and lead to skepticism. The circularity arises from the priority relation between justified 
beliefs about a source and justified beliefs produced by a source. Oftentimes, the only way to have 
justified beliefs about the reliability of a source is to use that very source. For instance, the only way to 
acquire justified beliefs about the reliability of testimony may be to use other instances of testimony. But 
that is circular. In this paper, I apply The Problem of Criterion to testimony and argue that Ernest Sosa’s 
virtue epistemology offers a solution.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Knowledge should arise from reliable sources. Knowledge without reliability would be 
lucky and lucky knowledge is not knowledge at all. This intuition leads some 
philosophers to accept KR: “A belief source K can produce justified beliefs for S only 
if S is justified in believing that K is reliable” (Evans & Smith, 86). KR seems 
plausible--I should be justified in believing that a belief source (such as sense 
perception or testimony) is reliable before it can produce justified beliefs. The issue is 
that KR leads to the problem of the criterion. The problem of the criterion is a vicious 
circularity that makes justification (and therefore knowledge) impossible. If there is no 
way out of this circularity, then accepting KR leads to skepticism.  
 
In this paper, I will show how the problem of the criterion applies to testimony and 
argue that Sosa’s virtue epistemology offers a solution. First, I explain KR and how it 
leads to the problem of the criterion. Next, I apply the problem of the criterion to 
testimony and explain why rejecting KR leads to the problem of easy justification. I 
then introduce Sosa’s virtue epistemology and show how it resolves the problem of the 
criterion. Lastly, I touch on several objections to Sosa’s view.   
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Problem of the Criterion 
 
KR is a principle about belief sources. A belief source is anything that produces or 
sustains a belief. More importantly, KR is a principle about the reliability of belief 
sources. A belief source is reliable if it usually gets things right (it often produces 
accurate beliefs). But under KR, mere reliability is not enough; one also has to be 
justified in believing that the source is reliable. This additional premise leads to the 
problem of the criterion (Cohen, “Basic Knowledge”, 310). 
 
The problem of the criterion is a vicious circularity that arises from KR. According to 
KR, a person must be justified in believing that a source is reliable before they can 
acquire justified beliefs from that source. But it seems like the only way to acquire 
justified beliefs about a source is to use beliefs from that very source. The circularity 
becomes more perspicuous if we apply the problem of the criterion to testimony. 
Testimony is anything that a person writes, speaks, or gesticulates in order to convey 
information. Newspapers and classroom lectures are paradigm examples of testimony. 
The problem of the criterion arises by accepting KR with respect to testimony:  
 
TR: “Testimony can produce justified beliefs for S only if S is justified in 
believing that testimony is reliable” (Evans & Smith, 104). 
 
Accepting TR produces a vicious circle--I have to be justified in believing that 
testimony is reliable before testimony can produce justified beliefs, but KR makes this 
impossible. When I try to acquire justified beliefs about testimony, I end up using 
instances of testimony. For instance, if I want to determine whether my beliefs about 
Christopher Columbus are justified, I have to use history books and professors. This is 
a case of justifying one belief from testimony using other instances of testimony. The 
problem is that KR prevents a person from using a belief source to justify beliefs about 
that source; a person needs justified beliefs about a source before that source can 
produce justified beliefs, but this is an impossible task under KR. This leads to 
skepticism because if testimony cannot produce justified beliefs, then it cannot be a 
source of knowledge (Evans & Smith, 86).  
 
To avoid the problem of the criterion, some philosophers dismiss KR. But rejecting KR 
leads to the problem of easy justification--a person can acquire justified beliefs even 
when there seems to be insufficient evidence for justification (Evans & Smith, 93). 
Consider the following scenario--while visiting a city for the first time, I ask someone 
for directions to State Street. If KR is false, then their directions immediately provide 
me with a justified belief about the location of State Street. This is counterintuitive 
because I was completely ignorant about this person’s reliability; I had little to no 
evidence that this person was a reliable source of testimony, yet I acquired a justified 
belief.1  
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What started as an intuitive principle (KR) has led to a two-horned dilemma: accepting 
KR leads to the problem of the criterion, but rejecting KR leads to the problem of easy 
justification. Fortunately, Sosa’s virtue epistemology shows how to accept KR without 
vicious circularity.  
 
Sosa’s Virtue Epistemology 
 
Sosa’s virtue epistemology provides a framework for evaluating beliefs. Sosa treats 
beliefs as performances with aims (Sosa, “Knowing”, 3). Sosa does this for two 
reasons. First, virtue epistemology is a normative enquiry--treating beliefs as 
performances allows one to evaluate beliefs because performances can be better or 
worse. Second, many things qualify as performances with aims, which shows that 
Sosa’s framework uses a common method of evaluating things in the world. For 
instance, a beating heart carries out performances with aims--the performance is the 
heartbeat and the aim is to beat steadily. Hearts can have aims even if they do not have 
intentions (Sosa, “Knowing”, 3).  
 
Sosa’s virtue epistemology rests on the AAA structure. Each A refers to a necessary 
condition for knowledge:  
 
- Accurate: this is the truth condition; the belief is accurate.  
- Adroit: a belief manifests skill or competence on behalf of the subject.  
- Apt: a belief is accurate because of a skill or competence manifested by the 
subject.  
 
Sosa often explains this AAA structure using the archer analogy: an archer’s 
performance is accurate if it hits the target; the performance is adroit if the shot 
manifests the archer’s skill or competence at archery; the performance is apt if the 
arrow hits the target because of the archer’s skill. An archer’s performance can be 
accurate without being adroit or apt--imagine an archer that shoots an arrow at the 
target, but a gust of wind blows the arrow off track. Fortunately, another gust of wind 
blows the arrow back and the arrow hits the target. In this case, the performance is 
accurate, but it is not adroit or apt. The arrow hit the target as a result of luck rather 
than skill. The archer analogy is supposed to show that people can form accurate or 
inaccurate beliefs and these beliefs can arise through skill or luck (Sosa, “Knowing”, 
4). All of these A’s can come in degrees--a belief can be more or less accurate, as well 
as more or less adroit--or they can be treated as threshold concepts. 
  
Sosa characterizes competences and skills as epistemic virtues. For Sosa, epistemic 
virtues are dispositions that reliably aim at truth and avoid error (Sosa, “Knowing”, 81). 
If epistemic virtues are just dispositions, then body parts and non-human animals can 
have epistemic virtues. The human eye can be epistemically virtuous by reliably 
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producing visual experiences that lead one to form accurate beliefs. A cat can be 
epistemically virtuous by reliably finding its litter box.  
 
Any epistemic virtue should be both specifically and generically reliable: reliable in 
particular instances (specifically reliable) and reliable overall (generic reliability) (Sosa, 
“Reflective”, 238). However, epistemic virtues are only specifically and generically 
reliable in their normal environments, “our faculties or virtues give us knowledge only 
if they work properly in an appropriate environment” (Sosa, “Knowledge”, 276). How 
one determines what these “normal” circumstances are is a problem that I will address 
in the objections to Sosa’s view. 
 
Sosa’s virtue epistemology is a two-level view. There are two different kinds of 
knowledge: there is animal knowledge and reflective knowledge. Animal knowledge is 
apt belief--a belief that is accurate because of a skill or competence manifested by the 
subject. Humans, as well as non-human animals, can have animal knowledge. 
Reflective knowledge is only available to humans and it is a higher epistemic 
accomplishment than animal knowledge. Reflective knowledge is apt belief aptly 
noted--a belief that is accurate because of a skill manifested by the subject, and the 
subject is cognitively aware of their skill (Sosa, “Reflective”, 135).   
 
Virtue Epistemology & Holistic Coherentism 
 
Sosa’s virtue epistemology resolves the problem of the criterion by incorporating 
holistic coherentism. Holistic coherentists think beliefs are like a web--beliefs cohere 
with one another and overtime, one acquires more and more beliefs; revising them 
along the way. For Sosa, beliefs cohere with one another by maximizing how well they 
explain other beliefs and features of the world (Sosa, “Knowledge”, 214). The degree 
of coherence depends on whether the beliefs offer conflicting explanations of the same 
subject matter. For instance, my belief about a mathematical formula can cohere well or 
poorly with beliefs about other mathematical formulas.  
 
Sosa invokes holistic coherentism because he thinks coherence always has some value, 
even if the coherent beliefs are false (Sosa, “Reflective”, 242). However, this is not 
entirely clear. In his earlier work, Sosa argued that coherence is a reliable way of 
attaining true beliefs (Sosa, “Knowledge”, 214). But in recent work, Sosa presents a 
weaker thesis, “I leave open the question of whether the nature of coherence, and of 
understanding/explanation, requires explanation in terms of reliability in the actual 
world” (Sosa, “Reflective”, 137).  
 
Holistic coherentism offers a plausible model for how beliefs relate to one another and 
the world. Some beliefs have little relation to one another (such as my belief that I have 
hands and my belief that Christopher Columbus sailed in 1492), but a person’s beliefs 
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are all based in part on other beliefs in their web, “By basing beliefs on other beliefs, 
the rational weaver weaves a web, each member of which is held in place in part 
(perhaps a miniscule part) through its being based on certain others, directly or 
indirectly” (Sosa, “Reflective”, 240). For instance, my belief that I have hands will be 
based on my perceptual experience as of having hands, as well as my belief that 
humans have hands, that hands look a certain way, and so on. Sosa seems to hold a 
causal theory of basing, but he leaves this issue to the side (Sosa, “Reflective”, 213; 
“Knowing”, 150).  
 
There can be coherence among animal, as well as reflective, knowledge. The only 
difference between coherence in the former and latter is that reflective knowledge 
requires beliefs about the reliability of coherence; meta-beliefs about coherence. There 
can also be coherence between animal knowledge and reflective knowledge (Sosa, 
“Reflective”, 243). Although holistic coherentism is usually portrayed as a single web 
of beliefs, it is possible for there to be multiple webs of belief; webs of animal 
knowledge that cohere well or poorly with webs of reflective knowledge. Although 
most coherentists talk of a single web, Sosa thinks that, “a plurality is more realistic” 
(Sosa, “Knowing”, Footnote 9, 150). Sosa also claims that reflective knowledge can 
cohere with animal knowledge by being based on animal knowledge (Sosa, 
“Reflective”, 243). For instance, reflective knowledge about one topic could be based 
on animal knowledge about another topic.  
 
Holistic coherentists offer a unique account of justification: one’s beliefs are not 
justified until they form a sufficiently large and coherent set of beliefs. Once one has 
such a set, one’s beliefs become justified all at once. Justification is conferred on one’s 
beliefs by one’s sufficiently large and coherent set of beliefs (Cohen, “Basic”, 322) 
Sosa modifies this coherentist account of justification by adding an internalist caveat--a 
person must be cognitively aware of the coherence between their beliefs and the 
reliability of coherence. Sosa refers to coherence plus cognitive awareness as “full 
coherence”. Full coherence is coherence between one’s first-order beliefs and one’s 
meta-beliefs about the reliability of coherence (Sosa, “Knowing”, 157).  
 
The Solution 
 
Holistic coherentism allows Sosa to accept KR without the ensuing vicious circularity. 
Invoking holistic coherentism removes any kind of priority relation between beliefs 
about a source and beliefs produced by the source. Sosa would agree that a belief 
source can only produce justified beliefs for someone if they are justified in believing 
that the source is reliable; the trick is that beliefs about a source and beliefs produced 
by that source become justified at the same time (Sosa, “Reflective”, 240).  
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Sosa mainly discusses this solution in relation to perceptual knowledge, but it works 
just as well for testimony: accepting KR does not lead to a vicious circularity because 
one’s beliefs based on testimony and one’s beliefs about testimony become justified at 
the same time. Once one acquires a sufficiently large and coherent set of beliefs, one 
will have justified beliefs about testimony and justified beliefs produced by testimony; 
justification is conferred all at once. This solution banishes any skepticism associated 
with KR and allows testimony to be a source of knowledge.  
 
Virtue Epistemology: Objection #1 
 
Sosa’s virtue epistemology and his solution to the problem of the criterion face a 
number of objections. One is that holistic coherentism seems to be doing all the work in 
resolving the problem of the criterion. If holistic coherentism provides the solution, 
then why talk about virtue epistemology?  
 
Here is one reason: Sosa’s virtue epistemology accommodates intuitions about the way 
a person should acquire true beliefs. One should not form true beliefs by any possible 
means. Rather, they should acquire true beliefs by manifesting epistemic virtue. 
Relying on holistic coherentism without a virtue epistemology would allow agents to 
acquire true beliefs through bad processes. For instance, I could acquire a true belief by 
copying my friend’s exam, but cheating seems like a bad way to form true beliefs. 
Cheating violates moral norms (such as the norm that cheating is wrong), but it also 
violates epistemic norms (such as the norm that one’s work should exhibit intellectual 
integrity). A virtue epistemology should accommodate such cases and explain why 
certain processes are not a good way to form true beliefs.  
 
However, Sosa’s virtue epistemology fails this intuitive test. In fact, Sosa’s model treats 
cheating as an epistemic virtue! Again, Sosa thinks epistemic virtues are truth 
conducive dispositions; dispositions that reliably aim at truth and avoid error. To see 
why Sosa’s model treats cheating as an epistemic virtue, imagine a case in which my 
friend almost always gets the right answer on exams. I am aware of this fact, so I 
develop a habit of cheating off my friend’s exam. By cheating off my friend, I almost 
always form true beliefs about the subject matter. For me, cheating is a truth-conducive 
disposition--I am disposed to acquire true beliefs by cheating off my friend’s exam! But 
this seems to be the opposite result of an adequate virtue epistemology--a case of 
intellectual dishonesty is now an instance of epistemic virtue.  
 
Virtue Epistemology: Objection #3 
 
Another objection is that knowledge from testimony does not fit Sosa’s AAA model. 
The worry is that knowledge from testimony does not involve any skill or competence 
on behalf of the subject. For instance, if I pick up a newspaper and form a true belief 
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from something I read, it does not seem like I deserve credit for my true belief; I 
acquired a true belief without manifesting any skill or competence. This violates Sosa’s 
model because animal and reflective knowledge both require that the subject acquire a 
true belief because they manifested skill or competence (Greco, 80).  
 
Fortunately, Sosa has a response. Sosa argues that even if a person does not deserve full 
credit for their true belief, they can still deserve partial credit and partial credit suffices 
for manifesting competence (Sosa, “Knowing”, 88). Sosa does not specify how much 
credit is “partial” credit, but the distinction between full and partial credit should be 
intuitive enough.  
 
Easy Justification 
 
If Sosa’s virtue epistemology faces so many objections, then maybe it is best to reject 
KR and face the problem of easy justification. This is an attractive option for 
philosophers who think the problem of easy justification is not really a problem. For 
instance, evidentialists embrace easy justification. They argue that, “one can know P on 
the basis of E without knowing that E is a reliable indication of P. For example, one can 
know that X is red, on the basis of its looking red, without knowing that X's looking red 
is a reliable indication of X's being red” (Cohen, “Basic Knowledge”, 310). Evidence 
provides defeasible justification even if a person does not know the evidence is reliable. 
(Cohen, “Bootstrapping”, 142). Reliabilists also accept easy justification. Reliabilism 
holds that in order for a belief to be justified, it must arise from a reliable source. 
Reliabilism accepts easy justification because belief sources can produce justified 
beliefs even if one is completely ignorant about the reliability of that source.  
 
One problem with evidentialism and reliabilism is that they allow for bootstrapping. 
Bootstrapping is when one uses a belief source to justify that very source. For instance, 
one can amass evidence of the form:  
 
‘On occasion one the wall looked red, and it was red; on occasion two the wall 
looked red, and it was red, etc.; moreover, there were no occasions on which the 
wall looked red and wasn’t red.’ From this impeccable track record, one infers 
by induction that one’s color vision is reliable. The resultant knowledge looks 
too easy, since one’s endorsement of the accuracy of the appearances was based 
on nothing but the appearances themselves (Van Cleve, 21).  
 
Bootstrapping is problematic because it relies on circular reasoning--instances of a 
belief source can justify that very source. This would be akin to evaluating the 
reliability of a newspaper by using other copies of that newspaper (Sosa, “Knowledge”, 
221). 
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Another problem is that one can use easy justification to acquire easy knowledge. This 
problem arises from justification closure and closure through known logical 
implication. Justification closer is the view that if S is justified in believing P and S 
deduces Q from P, then S is justified in believing Q (Evans & Smith, 91). Knowledge 
closure simply replaces “justification” with “knowledge” in this formulation.  
 
The problem is that a person can use an easily justified belief to acquire knowledge and 
then deduce another piece of knowledge, even when the deduced piece of knowledge 
does not seem like it should be knowledge. For instance, if KR is false, then I can be 
justified in believing that a table is red by its merely looking red. If the table actually is 
red, then I know the table is red. I can then run this knowledge through closure: if I 
know that the table is red, and I know that if the table is red then it is not white with red 
lights shining on it, then I know the table is not white with red lights shining on it. But 
this seems too easy: I should not know the table is not white with red lights shining on it 
from the mere fact that the table looked red (Cohen, “Why Basic”, 420).2  
 
These problems show why accepting easy justification is not a tenable option. Instead, 
we should return to Sosa’s solution: accepting KR by invoking holistic coherentism and 
virtue epistemology. However, Sosa’s solution is also guilty of bootstrapping! On 
Sosa’s account, one is using the coherence of one’s beliefs to justify the reliability of 
coherence, but this is circular. Here, Sosa bites the bullet, “It must be recognized that, 
by parity of reasoning, the mutual support even in these latter cases might add 
something of epistemic value. Coherence through mutual support seems a matter of 
degree, and even the minimal degree involved in simple bootstrapping is not worthless 
(Sosa, “Reflective”, 242). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The problem of the criterion no longer seems like a problem. Holistic coherentism and 
Sosa’s virtue epistemology eliminated the need for any kind of priority relation 
between beliefs about a source and beliefs produced by a source. But this solution 
comes at a cost. Relying on holistic coherentism has its own forms of circularity and 
some philosophers balk at the notion that a set of beliefs becomes justified “all at 
once”. However, given the available solutions, holistic coherentism in conjunction with 
a virtue epistemology is the best way out.   
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